# Network Defender First Principles

## **Rick Howard - CSO**













#### Time





#### Time









Non-Geeks – The Beautiful People



































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# **AUTHORITY: FEAR UNCERTAINTY AND DOUBT COMMITTEE**



**STATE OF CALIFORNIA** 





# **AUTHORITY: FEAR UNCERTAINTY AND DOUBT COMMITTEE**



# **STATE OF CALIFORNIA**



# Network Defender First Principles















# Elon Musk







# Elon Musk









# Elon Musk

















#### *Principia Mathematica* published in 1913











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**SIMILAR** 









**SIMILAR** 















































# Fundamental





# Fundamental

Self Evident





# Fundamental

Self Evident

Experts Agree





Fundamental

Self Evident

Experts Agree

Atomic





# Fundamental

Self Evident

Experts Agree

Atomic







# Fundamental

Self Evident

Experts Agree

Atomic







# Fundamental

Self Evident

Experts Agree

Atomic

First Principles -



New





1 + 1 = 2









# \*Note: Might be useful to know

1 + 1 = 2





#### Network Defender Problem Space





#### Network Defender Problem Space




































































































Victim











http://bobcivilwarhistory.blogspot.com/2009/07/gettysburg-campaign-part-3.html

#### Victim











# **Risk Matrix**









**Risk Matrix** 







































# What is it?





# What is it?

# What should it be?







# What should it be?

# What do we agree that it should it be?







"We must identify the trunk and the big branches first so that when we discover the leaves later, we will have something to hang them on."



# **Network Defender Semantic Tree**





#### **Network Defender Semantic Tree**




## **Network Defender Semantic Tree**





#### **Network Defender Semantic Tree**





# The Trunk

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• •

Likely

Almost

Certain





























# The First Limb

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**Indicators of Compromise** are forensic artifacts that describe an adversary's methodology; digital clues left behind by the adversary group as it works its way through the phases of the **attack lifecycle**.

WOLIVE
Attack Objective
Delivery
Exploitation
Command and Control
Lateral Movement
Actions on the Objective



**Indicators of Compromise** are forensic artifacts that describe an adversary's methodology; digital clues left behind by the adversary group as it works its way through the phases of the **attack lifecycle**.

Motive Attack Objective Delivery IOC Set Exploitation Command and Control Indicators of Compromise Lateral Movement Actions on the Objective





Indicators of Compromise are forensic artifacts that describe an adversary's methodology; digital clues left behind by the adversary group as it works its way through the phases of the attack lifecycle.

	Motive
IOC Set	Attack Objective
	Delivery
	Exploitation
	Command and Control
	Lateral Movement
	Actions on the Objective






































The **attack life cycle** is a phased model that describes the tasks an adversary group must accomplish in order to complete their mission







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**Threat Prevention** is the act of turning known indicators of compromise into one or more deployed **prevention controls**.



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### **99% GUARANTEE**





## **99% GUARANTEE**











# **The Second Limb**






























































































































# The Third Limb

























Threat eradication is the act of minimizing the effectiveness of newly discovered adversary campaign activity by blocking future activity through the Threat Prevention program, analyzing the purpose of this new campaign, and installing additional countermeasures that will likely thwart the accomplishment of the campaign objectives.





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→IMPACT MITIGATION







































# The Fourth Limb



















































# The Last Limb





Embrace cybersecurity intelligence collection and ubiquitous sharing

















# Collected






# Collected

## Sorted







# Collected

Sorted

## **Evaluated**







# Collected

Sorted

**Evaluated** 

Prioritized



Intelligence collection is the act of gathering Indicators of Compromise from network and endpoint systems throughout the enterprise and discovering any supplemental information from internal and external sources that can add context about what the adversary group is about.





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# **Benefits**

#















Embrace cybersecurity intelligence collection and ubiquitous sharing



# *The Cyber Threat Alliance*





## Founding CEOs











Mark McLaughlin





(intel) Security

Chris Young



Michael Brown

Ken Xie







## Founding Members:









Purpose: The Cyber Threat Alliance is a group of cyber security practitioners that have chosen to share threat information with each other for the purpose of improving defenses against advanced cyber adversaries across member organizations and their customers.





# Working Committee











Rick Howard Vishaal Hariprasad



F**::**RTINET,

Derek Manky



Vincent Weafer Jeannette Jarvis



Joe Chen



### 2 Initial Issues

### Build Trust

### **Build Infrastructure**











Rick Howard Vishaal Hariprasad





Derek Manky



Vincent Weafer Jeannette Jarvis



Joe Chen





# New Contributing Members:



Membership: Open to any organization that can share a minimum volume of threat intelligence designed by the Alliance.









# New Contributing Members:









Membership: Open to any organization that can share a minimum volume of threat intelligence designed by the Alliance.

White House Summit on Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection held at Stanford University





# Two Unique Organizing Principles:

- Must Contribute.
- Whatever is shared goes directly into the product line.

# **Result: Automatic Prevention Controls.**





## Founding CEOs





Mark McLaughlin













Chris Young



Michael Brown

Ken Xie



### Founding CEOs















Mark McLaughlin



Michael Brown



Ken Xie



Chris Young





















Mark McLaughlin





Ken Xie



Chris Young



Michael Brown









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Chris Young



Michael Brown

Ken Xie





### RANSOMWARE

Security vendors join together and reveal lucrative ransomware attacks affecting hundreds of thousands of users:

\$325M in estimated damages across the globe





second-tier IP addresses used for command and control

249 🔊 406,887 campaign code identifiers

₩4.046

attempted infections of CryptoWall version 3

malware samples







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AS325M in estimated damages across the globe BS39 Second-tier IP addresses used for command and control URLs AG49

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Where We Need to Go

The only smart thing for the network defender to do is to share everything; crowd source threat intelligence so that only the advanced adversary can keep up.



# Conclusion

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#### **25 Years of Incremental Improvement**





#### Rethink the Network Defender Problem Space





#### **Boiled Water**



#### **Rethink the Network Defender Problem Space**





#### **Rethink the Network Defender Problem Space**



Fundamental

Self Evident

**Experts** Agree

Atomic





Semantic Tree























The Network Defender's trinity is inextricably linked, atomic, and irreducible





Embrace cybersecurity intelligence collection and ubiquitous sharing



# More Information



#### **Call to Action**

#### First Principle White Paper:

http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/first-principles-for-network-defenders-a-unified-theory-for-security-practitioners/



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http://cyberthreatalliance.org/



https://paloaltonetworks.com/threat-research.html



https://paloaltonetworks.com/threat-research/cybercanon.html



# End

# Paloalto NETWORKS®